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
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SPECIAL REPORT

**INTELLIGENCE: ITS ROLE IN
COUNTERTERRORISM (U)**

OCTOBER 1981

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INTELLIGENCE: ITS ROLE IN COUNTERTERRORISM (U)

A Counterintelligence Special Report (U)

Counterintelligence Production Division
US Army Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center

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PREFACE

This paper was prepared by Major Alex C. Wylie (ITAC CIPD) for submission in a graduate level Terrorism Symposium during the Summer 1981 semester at George Washington University, Washington, DC. The increasing emphasis on counter-terrorism within the US military, which resulted in the creation of a Counter-terrorism Course at the US Army Military Police School, Ft McClellan, AL, in mid-1980, suggested an assessment of the role intelligence can reasonably be expected to play in countering terrorist activity that might be directed against the US military would be both timely and useful. This paper is intended to provide insight into factors which impact on an influence terrorist activity, while suggesting the most appropriate role for intelligence in countering that activity.

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Executive Summary

Terrorism is defined and the goals of terrorist groups are examined in light of how goals relate to terrorist activity. Considering the advantages that accrue to terrorist groups, the methodology of assessing terrorists' capabilities and ideology is discussed. Terrorism analysis tends to be event oriented, and the significance of a terrorist group's "track record" as it relates to what actions the group is likely to attempt is explored. Various agencies within the US Government have a terrorism analysis role, but responsibilities and objectives vary; a brief discussion of these agencies and their perspective for terrorism analysis is included. The role of intelligence in both pre and post-incident analysis is discussed, and a system is suggested for portraying threat magnitude that could standardize assessments and thereby make them more meaningful to those who rely on analysts' judgements to make decisions on security requirements.

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INTELLIGENCE: ITS ROLE IN COUNTERTERRORISM

Terrorism is not a new phenomenon, but the level of its use as a tactic of political protest since the late 1960s is unprecedented. Since 1968, the number of terrorist acts throughout the world has evidenced a steady and alarming rise, accompanied by a similarly disturbing increase in the number of people wounded and killed as a result of extremists' initiatives (REF FIG 1 and FIG 2). Governments and their security services have had varying amounts of success in deterring and suppressing terrorist activity, but only in rare instances have extremist groups been eliminated as a threat in any country. If security forces in any country plagued by terrorism today are to be successful in containing terrorist activity, it is imperative that they be supported by effective intelligence which, according to Kupperman (1), is perceived to be the "first line of defense."

Before the role of intelligence in counterterrorism efforts can be examined, it is necessary to briefly define terrorism, discuss factors motivating acts of political violence, and surface factors which limit the effectiveness of intelligence in dealing with the subject. No universally accepted definition of terrorism has been established, and that fact, unto itself, has had an adverse effect on efforts to combat the threat posed by terrorist groups in many of the world's industrialized countries over the past decade. A definition of terrorism used within the Department of Defense which is useful in understanding the phenomenon of terrorism from the perspective of the US Government is:

"Terrorism is the calculated use of violence or the threat of violence to attain political goals through instilling fear, intimidation, or coercion. Terrorism usually involves a criminal act, often symbolic in nature, intended to influence an audience beyond the immediate victims."

Terrorism is a tactic which can be employed, in a political sense, by those in power to intimidate the people and thereby protect their position, as well as by those out of power who are attempting to destabilize and overthrow the existing political order. This paper will focus on the latter and examine the overall subject of intelligence as it relates to the efforts of security forces to counterterrorist activities.

An understanding of terrorism requires more than a definition of the subject. It is necessary to understand what motivates individuals to band together and carry out acts of violence, many of which victimize innocent bystanders. Terrorist groups have political goals, just as a military force involved in combat has objectives. Publicity, according to Evans (2), is the major goal of the five he cites as motivating most terrorists. They carry out acts of violence to impress those in whose interest they claim to be acting, to gain the attention of the authority against which the group is targeted, and, in many cases, to

INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST INCIDENTS, 1968-1980

TOTAL INCIDENTS: 6,714




Figure 1. Patterns of International Terrorism: 1980 (CIA)

INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST INCIDENTS THAT CAUSED CASUALTIES, 1968-1980

TOTAL INCIDENTS: 1,435




Figure 2. Patterns of International Terrorism: 1980 (CIA)

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bring the group's cause before some portion or all of the international community. This factor in terrorist motivation is consistent with the popularized theory advanced by Jenkins (3) in 1974 that "terrorism is theater", with terrorists' activities intended to play to a world audience.

The second goal of terrorist groups, Evans (2) maintains, is to harass and intimidate the establishment and force them to make concessions - a form of "Coercive diplomacy". A third terrorist goal in many instances, is to polarize society by forcing the public to choose sides and the government to respond to acts of political violence with increase repression. A fourth goal motivating acts of violence may be to aggravate relationships between states to influence the course of political events which could be unfavorable to the terrorists' cause. For example, Palestinian terrorists used terrorism in 1972 at the Olympic Games in Munich, West Germany, to sabotage an Israeli plan to withdraw from the banks of the Suez Canal, indirectly causing the Israeli Egyptian War of 1973. Finally, the fifth goal of terrorist action is often the freeing of prisoners and/or the securing of monetary ransoms. Numerous examples of this motive can be cited from the history of the past 15 years.

Terrorism should be viewed as a form of low intensity warfare which can be practiced in either an urban or rural environment, as well as internationally. Terrorism is a covert tactic, usually carried out by small, cellular groups employing strict secrecy, that confronts security forces with a most serious challenge. Terrorists, according to Jenkins (4), take advantage of the fact they "operate in the cracks between organizational boundaries and missions, just beyond law enforcement, just before national security, where intelligence files touch the limits of legality." Terrorist groups, Gazit and Handel (5) maintain, in many cases have exploited and been aided by the very laws they are attempting to destroy. When the government being challenged by terrorism elects to adhere to the accepted legal norms of a democratic society that favor individual privacy and constrain police authority, the extremist find themselves being supported by the policy of their intended targets. Not only is it easier for them to carry out illegal, covert acts of violence, the organization itself or its support groups can maintain overt, legal actions which strengthen terrorist operations.

Regardless of their size, or the expertise and experience of their members, terrorist groups have several advantages over those charged with responsibility for countering their initiatives. While terrorists lack the military principle of mass or superior strength, they do capitalize on the principle of surprise. Terrorist can select their targets far in advance, plan the attack with great attention to detail based on extensive surveillance of the target, rehearse the attack to perfect timing and execution, and then proceed to carry out the operation at a time and place favoring success. These factors in terrorist modus operandi were recently observed in the 15 September 1981 assassination attempt on the life of the CINC USAREUR in Heidelberg, West Germany. a tactic employed by some terrorist groups to increase operational security involves a delay in

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bringing the "action team" together until the last possible moment, consistent with rehearsal requirements, to minimize the possibility of compromise.

As valuable as the element of surprise may be to terrorist groups in carrying out attacks, as noted by Gazit and Handel (5) the high degree of secrecy and compartmentation practiced by extremist organizations is a paramount importance in efforts to offset or compensate for their potential vulnerability. The cellular structure of most terrorist groups is the single greatest factor frustrating attempts to gain intelligence to support counterterrorist operations.

The ultimate goal of intelligence is to provide the consumer answers to the basic interrogatives: who? what? where? when? how? and why? Applying these questions to a hypothetical terrorist scenario, the intelligence product would ideally inform the security service that the Red Homeland terrorist group will attempt to assassinate the leader of the National Liberty political party outside his home tomorrow morning at about 0730 hours when he leaves for work. The terrorists will fire automatic weapons from a passing car in an effort to kill the political leader to protest strong support by his party for strict anti-terrorist legislation pending in the National Assembly. Information in the detail provided in this scenario, which is more than adequate to enable security forces to intercept the terrorist group and protect the intended victim, can come from only one source - from within the terrorist organization.

To gain access to such information, the security force must be successful in penetrating the organization, a task ranging from most difficult to impossible depending on the structure of the group and the level of security practice by its members. If a penetrant is successfully introduced into a terrorist group, a problem arises as to how that person reacts when he or she is handed a weapon or a bomb and directed to participate in an assassination. An alternative approach to gaining access to inside information involves cultivating a relationship with a member of a terrorist group in an effort to develop him or her as a source, and ultimately turning the terrorist against the organization. This is an almost impossible task in light of the fierce, often fanatical, loyalty frequently demonstrated by many terrorists. The likelihood of successfully penetrating most terrorist organizations in any manner is remote for a variety of reasons, not the least of which are: the length of the time needed to establish credentials required to be accepted by the group, the cost of supporting long-term operations, the risks to the penetrant, and the improbability that even a successful penetrant will be able to overcome compartmentation sufficiently to learn anything worthwhile.

An intelligence organization targeted against terrorist groups will have goals which vary according to the strategic objectives of the government it serves, according to Gazit and Handel (5). If the government operates under a "defensive-passive strategy", its goal will be limited to having its intelligence assets warn about the appearance of a terrorist threat before it begins to operate. Intelligence will attempt to provide information which will support efforts to prevent any terrorist group from carrying out planned operations,

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make it more difficult for it to operate, and recommend ways to minimize potential danger. In contrast, they describe an "active counter-strategy" which, as its title suggests, involves aggressive actions by security forces intended to pursue terrorists, both within and outside national borders. Such a program will attempt to disrupt a terrorist group's organization, seize its weapons and equipment, gain the support of neighboring countries in counter-terrorist efforts, employ deception and disinformation tactics, and carry out operations to create intrigues, friction, and intra-organizational conflicts between competing terrorist groups.

It is highly unlikely that a pure "defensive" or "active" strategy, as defined by Gazit and Handel (5), would be found in any country which was encountering any type of extremist unrest. The United States, for the most part spared the plague of terrorist violence which most other Western democracies have encountered over the past 15 years, today finds itself in a predominantly "defensive" posture vis-a-vis terrorism. However, that posture has been modified by acts of terrorism carried out by domestic terrorist groups such as the Puerto Rican nationalist groups, as well as the activity of foreign groups operating in the United States, to include anti-Castro Cuban groups, Croatian nationalist, and Libyan assassination teams. In other countries, such as Turkey and Italy, the posture of intelligence groups targeted against terrorist groups is heavily weighted toward the "active counter-strategy" in response to a much higher, more violent level of political unrest stemming primarily, but not exclusively, from the left. A purely defensive strategy will ultimately result in failure, according to Gazit and Handel (5), because it can only be successful with highly specific intelligence which is, much more often than not, unavailable. This position would certainly pertain to any country confronting a serious terrorist challenge, but might be overly pessimistic for a country, such as the United States, which has not been plagued by a significant incidence of politically motivated violence.

The virtually impossible task of obtaining the type of intelligence necessary to preempt a specific terrorist attack against an identified target places a significant burden on the intelligence community. To provide those responsible for countering terrorist operations with that information needed to accomplish their mission, intelligence analysts must draw on all available data pertaining to a terrorist group to produce assessments which outline likely courses of terrorist activity. Assessments rendered on terrorist groups must be subjective, based primarily on an evaluation of the group's capabilities, ideology, modus operandi, past activity, and the current security environment in which the group is forced to operate.

The analyst, in evaluating the capabilities of the terrorist group, must take into consideration its strength. For example, the capability of the major Puerto Rican terrorist group operating in the United States was reduced significantly in April 1980 when 11 of its members, including two leaders, were arrested in a Chicago suburb. Such a setback would be considered serious by most terrorist groups operating anywhere in the world today, with the exception

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of the Palestinian organizations, the Provisional Irish Republican Army, and some terrorist/guerrilla groups in Latin America. However, in the case of the Puerto Rican terrorist group in United States, the loss of 11 members as the result of a single police operation dealt the organization a blow from which it has yet to recover.

Capability is also determined by the expertise of the terrorists which is, in turn, a product of training and experience. If a terrorist group has sent its members to training camps operated in the Middle East by the Palestinians, the analyst must accord that group more respect than if its members were schooled in the tactics of terrorism by veterans within the organization, or, worse yet, learned only as a result of on-the-job training.

Another significant factor in assessing capability is the types of weapons, explosives, and other equipment to which the terrorist group has access. If it is known that modern, sophisticated weapons such as surface-to-air missiles, rocket propelled grenade launchers, and anti-tank weapons are available to terrorist group it is obvious that, barring complete incompetency, the threat posed by that group will be significant. Generally speaking, intelligence analysts have information which enables them to assess the capability of a given terrorist organization with some degree of confidence, particularly if it has been on the scene for an extended period of time - as is the case with most major terrorist groups operating in the world today.

The ideology of terrorist groups is a most valuable indicator available to the intelligence analyst. To an analyst examining the terrorist threat to the United States interests in Turkey, for example, it is vital that he know if the major groups operating in that troubled country are leftist or right-wing in orientation. Also, he should be aware of whether or not they have espoused anti-military, anti-NATO sentiments which would suggest a tendency to motivate the targeting of US military presence. Ideology alone, while helpful, does not provide the analyst with a foundation on which an assessment can be based. However, when combined with other factors, it contributes to the overall estimate of what a group is most likely to attempt.

Having considered capabilities and ideology, the analyst must depend to a great extent on the track record established by the group in question. If, for example, the Puerto Rican terrorists in the United States are the subject of an assessment, the analyst would note that in the US the group has relied almost exclusively on bombings and short term hostage operations. These types of acts have good potential to gain publicity for the group and its separatist cause, while exposing the terrorists to minimum risk of apprehension. This modus operandi is characteristic of most terrorist groups which have limited personnel and physical resources. Looking again at Turkey, the analyst would become aware of the rather significant fact virtually the only US Government presence which has attracted terrorist interest in that country has been the US military - in no case has the US diplomatic presence been targeted in Turkey. The fact, combined with the capability of several Turkish terrorist groups and their

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anti-US/anti-NATO ideology, would contribute significantly to the ultimate assessment of the terrorist threat to the US military presence in Turkey.

Another example of the process of considering past activity of terrorist groups can be drawn from Italy. An assessment of the Italian Red Brigades would have to take into consideration the fact that the group has successfully carried out sophisticated kidnapping sophisticated but nevertheless daring "kneecappings". An examination of past activity alone suggests that the Red Brigades in Italy is a much more potent terrorist force than the US-based Puerto Rican terrorist group. However, the Red Brigades, it must be noted, has never targeted the US military in Italy. Of all the criteria employed to evaluate the magnitude and nature of the threat posed by a given terrorist group, its history of activity is of greatest value, supported by available data on capability, munitions, ideology, and the security environment prevailing in the country in question.

Terrorism analysis is performed by various agencies within the US Government, with the scope or direction of their respective efforts dictated by their area of interest and specific needs unique to their requirements. At the National level within the US Government, primary terrorism analysis is performed on foreign terrorist groups by the Central Intelligence Agency. The Federal Bureau of Investigation is charged with responsibility for monitoring and reporting on activities of domestic terrorist groups, as well as foreign groups such as the Croatians and Armenians operating in the United States. The CIA, as a pure intelligence agency, has an extensive capability to monitor, gather information, and produce in-depth analysis on a broad cross-section of matters relating to terrorism in foreign countries. The FBI, based on its primary responsibility for law enforcement/criminal investigation, over the years has focused its attention on the criminal aspects of terrorism. The production of intelligence in general, and information relating to terrorism specifically, has been a by-product of FBI investigative efforts. As a result, the FBI has not had a significant capability to assess intelligence stemming from its investigations in the area of terrorist activity and disseminate that intelligence to consumers in the National Intelligence Community. This has, as a result, contributed to a gap in intelligence reference domestic terrorist activity which has been compounded by laws passed in the early 1970s which have restricted the freedom of US intelligence agencies to collect information on US citizens and foreigners residing in the United States. The State Department has a terrorism analysis capability primarily intended to support Department needs, such as planning for enhancement of security measures at "high risk" diplomatic facilities around the world and planning protective service missions.

Within DoD, the Defense Intelligence Agency and the intelligence branches of the three services have, as a part of their mission, a requirement to produce assessments of the actual or potential terrorist threat targeted against US military interests throughout the world. Those assessments are used by decision makers at the highest levels within DoD and in each of the branches of the armed forces for a variety of purposes, all of which are related to the services' attempts to deter terrorist initiatives against sensitive military targets, other military facilities, and US military personnel overseas.

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Assessments produced at the National level of the terrorist threat stemming from groups perceived to pose a potential threat to US interests, while based on the best information available from all sources within the National Intelligence Community, are often necessarily general in nature. The purpose of those assessments is to provide consumers, military commanders and security personnel for example, intelligence which they can use as a basis for local threat assessments tailored to reflect local conditions as reported by host country security/law enforcement agencies and in-country US intelligence assets in overseas areas. In the United States, liaison with local, county and state law enforcement agencies and regional offices of the FBI is imperative in counterterrorist efforts are to be effective.

If intelligence analysts effectively perform their job of assessing the magnitude of the terrorist threat to specific US interest, either overseas or in the United States, those targets deemed to be both most vulnerable and attractive to terrorists attack can be identified by commanders and provided enhanced protection. The value of "hardening" the target stems from the historically established fact that terrorist groups habitually attack undefended, poorly protected, or highly vulnerable facilities and personnel. For example, by providing intelligence from the National level to US military forces in a given country overseas that the terrorist threat to key military officers is assessed to be made in that country as to the best way to counter that threat. If prior consideration has been given to the attractiveness/vulnerability of targets in a given area, the process of implementing enhanced protection at key facilities when an increased threat is reported is significantly enhanced.

To this point, the intelligence role reference counterterrorism efforts has been discussed from a pre-incident perspective. If intelligence fails to anticipate a terrorist initiative and if attractive and vulnerable targets are not adequately protected and a terrorist group strikes, intelligence still has a counterterrorism role to play. If the attack is a bombing, an assassination, or a similar incident that takes place and is completed rapidly, the role of intelligence is generally reduced to drawing on evidence from the act in an attempt to identify the group responsible - a task usually made easier by the propensity of terrorist groups to claim credit for the operations, particularly if successful, to capitalize on the publicity. Occasionally, more than one terrorist group will claim credit for a terrorist act, making the job of the intelligence analyst somewhat more difficult. A case in point was the fact that three groups claimed credit for the May 1981 assassination of a West German politician in Frankfurt, the most dramatic terrorist assassination operation in that country since 1977 when Hanns-Martin Schleyer was kidnapped and assassinated. Once an incident takes place, the analyst has to assess the implications of that act for future attacks, taking into consideration all those factors discussed earlier which influence terrorist actions.

The role of intelligence is particularly vital in the post-incident phase of a hostage/barricade situation where the lives of innocent persons are placed

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in jeopardy. The critical role of intelligence in a hostage/barricade incident are illustrated by the experience of the British Special Air Service Regiment (SAS), Great Britain's highly trained counterterrorist force, in assaulting the Iran Embassy in London in May 1980. The embassy was seized by five dissident Iranian terrorists who initially held 26 hostages and demanded the release of 91 persons jailed in Khuzestan Province in southern Iran and a plane to fly themselves and their hostages to an unspecified destination. According to the SAS operations officer for the embassy operation, Major Ian Crooke, when his unit responded to the scene they advised those responsible for making a decision on the military option to resolving the situation that if they were committed immediately, they faced a 10 to 20 percent likelihood of success in rescuing the hostages. The low probability of success, despite the skill of the counterterrorist team, resulted from a lack of intelligence at that stage of the incident.

The intelligence picture slowly but steadily improved as a result of an aggressive effort to develop a better understanding of the situation inside the embassy, to include the layout of the four story building. Information gleaned from five hostages who were released by the terrorists during the six-day siege contributed to the improved intelligence picture which increased the force's chances of success with each passing hour. The released hostages were able to provide invaluable information on the terrorist's behavior, activity, and physical condition. The assessed likelihood of success of a military assault to rescue the hostages grew to 40 percent, then to 60 percent. By the time a hostage was killed on 5 May and the lives of the remaining 19 hostages were considered to be in serious danger, the expectation of success had jumped to 90-90 percent. This factor, combined with the fact a murdered hostage had been kicked out the front door of the embassy, contributed to a decision to assault the embassy. Detailed planning, rehearsals, and analysis of the situation preceded the successful assault which took about 30 minutes to complete. Throughout the preparation phase, the SAS team drew heavily on the intelligence base that had been painstakingly built up over the days during which negotiation were pursued in an effort to end the embassy take over without military intervention.

Intelligence in a hostage/barricade situation must be drawn from all available sources. Technical equipment may be employed to record conversations for subsequent analysis, and whenever possible should be used to monitor terrorist conversations in all areas of hostage facility. Photography, obtained by using an appropriate mix of still, movie, and television cameras, can be exploited for intelligence analysis, as well as after-action lessons learned assessments. All law enforcement/counterterrorist personnel in position at the scene have a potential intelligence function which can be rapidly exploited through good communications. Once the hostage takers are identified, a maximum effort must be made to obtain quickly all available information on the terrorists to enable intelligence to support the hostage negotiator in his attempt to defuse the situation without violence. The SAS experience at the Iran Embassy in May 1980 is viewed as a classic example of the manner in which many similar crises have

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been handled in recent years and will likely be managed in future. Negotiations will, in most cases, be the favored approach as long as the lives of the hostages are not seriously jeopardized. This tactic gains time for reaction teams to prepare for possible employment, while maximizing the opportunity for the terrorist to be talked into surrendering. On-the-scene intelligence support, provided by personnel trained in how to draw on all available sources of information to support the potential assault on the besieged facility, is imperative.

In conclusion, a need exists for an improved method of communicating the magnitude of the threat posed by terrorist groups to those who have need to be aware of the likelihood of terrorist activity, such as military commanders and security personnel responsible for the implementation of countermeasures. The present use of such nebulous terms as "low", "high", "increased", and others which are similarly general and open to interpretation is inadequate. The simplest system is envisioned as one which would be based on a scale of 1 (lowest threat) to 5 (highest threat). In an escalating magnitude of threat, this assessment technique would function according to the following definitions:

- THREAT STATUS 1: No available information indicates terrorist groups are planning to attack the interests of the activity which is the subject of the assessment. Terrorist activity in the area in general is not significant. It is considered unlikely any terrorist initiative will be directed against the subject activity.
- THREAT STATUS 2: No available information indicates terrorist groups are planning to attack the interests of the activity which is the subject of the assessment. Terrorist groups are present and active or have the potential to initiate activity in the area. It is considered unlikely any terrorist initiative will be directed against the subject activity, but based on terrorist capabilities/goals, the possibility of an attack cannot be discounted.
- THREAT STATUS 3: No available information indicates terrorist groups are planning to attack the interests of the activity which is the subject of the assessment. However, terrorist groups' capabilities/ideology indicate they pose a threat to the interests of the subject activity. At a minimum, planning for the implementation of increased security measures should be implemented.
- THREAT STATUS 4: Reporting indicates terrorist groups may be planning to attack the interests of the acti-

vity which is the subject of the assessment. Terrorist groups' capabilities/actions/ideology indicate they pose a potentially significant threat to the interests of the subject activity. Increased security precautions at key facilities and for key personnel should be implemented, and liaison with local authorities increased.

THREAT STATUS 5: Reporting indicates that terrorist groups are either planning to attack the interests of the activity which is the subject of the assessment, or that all evidence suggests such an attack is very likely. Maximum security precautions consistent with the nature of the assessed threat should be implemented and closest liaison with local authorities maintained.

Intelligence plays a vital role in the counterterrorism efforts of all countries facing a real or potentially serious terrorist threat. Lacking adequate intelligence, security forces attempting to counter the activities of terrorist groups which operate covertly, employing strict security, and having compartmented organizational structures, have little chance of success. Should incidents of terrorism continue to increase in the 1980s at a pace anywhere near that observed over the past decade, and some students of the phenomenon have predicted it will, the importance of intelligence in relationship to terrorism will increase dramatically. The ability of intelligence to be responsive to requirements will, in large measure, be dependent on the willingness of the intelligence community to develop and refine those techniques employed in the past to assess the magnitude of the threat posed by terrorism. Analysts will better serve the needs of those who require assessments to plan for and implement countermeasures if they draw on available information and provide assessments, backed by rationale, which reflect the best possible projection of the magnitude and nature of the terrorist threat. Assessments often must be made with less than desired backup information when dealing with terrorism, but that fact should not limit the ability of analysts to provide commanders and security managers input which will guide them in their efforts to protect facilities and personnel from terrorist attack. As stated by Kupperman (1), intelligence is the first line of defense", and the manner in which available information is used by intelligence analysts in the future will impact on the overall vulnerability of United States interests to terrorism.

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C306	1	82ND ABN DIV	C459	1	COMD-GEN STF COL
C307	1	24TH INF DIV	C470	1	ARMY WAR COL
C345	1	433D MID (STRAT)	C500	1	TRADOC
C507	1	USAITAC (IAX-TA-G)	C644	1	LOG CTR
C510	1	R&T LABS/AVRADCOM	C646	1	CMBARMSCMBTDEVACTY
C513	1	ARRADCOM	C649	1	SIG CTR&FT GORDON
C535	1	AVRADCOM/TSARCOM	C683	1	INTEL CTR&SCH
C538	1	WHITE SANDS MSL RG	C684	2	USAISD
C539	1	TRASANA	C697	1	TEST & EVAL COMD
C553	1	COMMUNICATIONS CMD	C754	1	IASD-LNO
C569	1	MERADCOM	C755	1	902D MIG
C591	2	FSTC	C756	1	900TH MI CO
C605	3	JFK CTR MIL ASSIST	C757	1	SED
C617	1	CONCEPT ANLYS AGCY	C765	1	USAITAC (IAX-TA-C)
C619	2	MIA REDSTONE	C766	1	HQDA DAMI-FIO
C620	1	USAITAC (IAX-TA-R)	C767	1	HQDA DAMI-ISH
C623	1	USAOG	C788	1	HQDA DAMI-FIS
C632	2	CHEMICAL SCHOOL	C799	7	HQDA MISG/OE
C633	1	ORDNANCE CTR & SCH	C813	1	USAFS AUGSBURG
C635	1	AIR DEF AGCY	C814	1	OACSI SCI LIBRARY
C641	1	AVIATION CTR&SCH	C819	1	5TH SFG(ABN)1ST SF

US NAVY

D007 1 NIS HQ (CODE 22P)
D039 1 FOURTH MAW/MARTC

US AIR FORCE

E226 1 AFDSI/IVOA

UNIFIED AND SPECIFIED COMMANDS

F010	1	ARRS/IN	J522	1	COMNAVBASEGTCM
G005	1	CINCAD	J525	1	COMNAVFORCARIB
H005	1	USCINCUSAREUR	J575	1	FMFLANT
H101	1	USAFE 497RTG (IRC)	J576	1	COMPFIUGRU 2
H310	1	USASOEURTASKFORCE	K005	1	CINCPAC
H320	1	66TH MI GP	K007	1	COMUSJAPAN
H350	1	SFDET (ABN) EUR	K010	1	USFK
H500	1	CINCUSNAVEUR	K033	1	COMOCEANSYSPAC
H511	1	COMSIXTFFLT	K100	1	PACAF 548 RTG
H519	1	COMFAIRMED (N2)	K101	1	PACAF/DOIA
H524	1	HQ V CORPS	K201	1	13TH AF
H525	1	HQ VII CORPS	K300	1	IPAC (LIBRARY)
H526	1	HQ 3RD INF DIV	K302	1	USAWESTCOM
H528	1	1ST INF DIV (FWD)	K313	2	IPAC (CODE 1A)
J009	1	JUWTF	K314	1	IPAC (CODE PT)
J010	1	CCCJTF/CJKF	K320	1	USARJAPAN
F005	1	CINCMAC	K342	1	2ND INF DIV
H005	1	USCINCEUR	K408	1	COMDAIWPACT 4282
H006	1	USEUCOM DEFANALCTR	K413	1	MAG 12 4601
H007	1	SILK PURSE	K415	1	MAG 15 4601
H010	1	SOTFE (J-3)	K505	1	FICPAC
H300	1	USAICE (USAREUR)	K514	1	COMTHIRDFLT
H303	1	502D I&S BN (PROV)	K515	1	COMSEVENTHFLT
H306	1	DCSI US COM BERLIN	K601	1	FIRSTMAW
H330	1	32D AADC	K612	1	THIRDMARDIV
H529	1	HQ 3RD ARMORED DIV	K650	1	COM AVSURFPAC
H530	1	HQ 1ST ARMORED DIV	K658	1	COMUSNAVPHIL
J501	1	USCOMSDLANT	K710	1	FISC WESTPAC
J502	1	COMSECONDFLT	L005	1	CINCSAC
J505	1	COMNAVAILANT	L040	2	SAC 544 SIW/DAA
J515	1	FICEURLANT	M005	1	USCINCSO
J517	1	COMNAVSURPLANT	N005	1	USREDCOM

OTHERS

P007	1	DOE/NV/SSD/COCO	P127	1	US SECRET SERVICE
P056	1	CIA/SA/DCI/CI	R048	1	FEMA
P076	1	STATE INR/IAA	R066	1	USCG OI
P090	10	NSA			

ADDED DISTRIBUTION

1	B617	DIA-DB3
1	B485	DIA-AIS
1	C740	HQDA DAMI-CIC (COURIER)
1	C353	470TH MI GP
1	C309	500TH MI GP
1	C310	501ST MI GP
1	C065	USAINSCOM ITIC-PAC
1	C397	650TH MI GP
2	H005	USCINCUSAREUR AEAGB-CI
1		USAINSCOM IADCDR-OPS (COURIER)
1		USAINSCOM IAOPS-OP (COURIER)
1		USAINSCOM IAOPS-PDN (COURIER)
2		USAINSCOM SPECIAL OPS DET FGGM (COURIER)
1		DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY ARMY POLICY REVIEW (DIR CI & IP)
1		CDR, 165TH MI BN, APO NY 09757
1		CDR, 511TH MI BN, APO NY 09105
1		CDR, 527TH MI BN, APO NY 09054
1		CDR, 18TH MI BN, APO NY 09108
1		CDR, 548TH MID, APO NY 09168
1		CDR, 766TH MID, APO NY 09742

TOTAL COPIES: 211